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Abstract
Many applications require the immutable and consistent
sharing of data across organizational boundaries. Because
conventional datastores cannot provide this functionality,
blockchains have been proposed as one possible solution.
Yet public blockchains are energy inefficient, hard to scale
and suffer from limited throughput and high latencies, while
permissioned blockchains depend on specially designated
nodes, potentially leak meta-information, and also suffer
from scale and performance bottlenecks.
This paper presents CreDB, a datastore that provides
blockchain-like guarantees of integrity using trusted execu-
tion environments. CreDB employs four novel mechanisms
to support a new class of applications. First, it creates a
permanent record of every transaction, known as a witness,
that clients can then use not only to audit the database but to
prove to third parties that desired actions took place. Sec-
ond, it associates with every object an inseparable and invi-
olable policy, which not only performs access control but
enables the datastore to implement state machines whose
behavior is amenable to analysis. Third, timeline inspec-
tion allows authorized parties to inspect and reason about
the history of changes made to the data. Finally, CreDB
provides a protected function evaluation mechanism that al-
lows integrity-protected computation over private data. The
paper describes these mechanisms, and the applications they
collectively enable, in detail. We have fully implemented a
prototype of CreDB on Intel SGX. Evaluation shows that
CreDB can serve as a drop-in replacement for other NoSQL
stores, such as MongoDBwhile providing stronger integrity
guarantees.
1 Introduction
Many high-value applications require the reliable and immutable
storage of data across multiple distrusting parties [51, 17, 56].
These applications are characterized by integrity requirements
wherein each party must abide by pre-defined policies. Conven-
tional databases cannot live up to this challenge, as they require
full trust in the database application and host operating system.
Blockchains have recently emerged as a potential platform to
address the needs of these applications. Public blockchains [38,
52], based on Nakamoto consensus, maintain an immutable log
of events distributed across all participants of the system. As a
result, they are energy inefficient, hard to scale and suffer from
limited throughput and high latencies [15]. Further, due to their
open and distributed setting, they cannot be used to store pri-
vate or confidential data. Permissioned blockchains [10, 3, 2]
employ a committee consensus protocol [11, 28, 23] to maintain
the log and append updates in an orderly fashion. Changes can
only be made if a specified quorum of the committee agrees to do
so. This approach necessarily requires specially designated com-
mittee nodes, exposes at least meta-information to those nodes,
and is limited in performance by bottlenecks in the quorum.
These efforts were preceded by earlier work on accountability
systems [27, 53], which ensure integrity by allowing clients to
audit the log with respect to states they have observed previ-
ously. But accountability mechanisms can only enforce fork
consistency [35, 18], a weaker security property than strong con-
sistency.
This work presents CreDB, a novel datastore that provides
the integrity guarantees of blockchains, using much more effi-
cient and scalable techniques backed by secure hardware. In a
nutshell, CreDB provides an append-only log [13] of partially-
ordered states. Past states cannot be changed and new states can
only be appended to the log. Building on this foundation, CreDB
nodes can operate independently, as a “blockchain of one,” or as
part of a network of nodes that can share designated data items
and invoke computations on each other. Each node in the system
runs in a trusted execution environment (TEE), provided by the
system’s hardware. The usage of TEEs enables nodes to trust
another participant’s computation without trusting the adminis-
trator of that system. Because each service can run their own
database node backed by a TEE, the throughput scales with the
number of nodes in the system.
CreDB nodes issue witnesses, which are permanent and
tamper-proof certificates of the state of the system. Further, they
are independently verifiable, i.e. verification does not depen-
dent on a specific node in the system. Witnesses can be used
to establish facts about the datastore, such as the instantaneous
contents of objects, the existence of certain data or past transac-
tions, and ordering of transactions. This enables even untrusted
applications, backed by CreDB, to provide proofs of their correct
operation to third parties. Because witnesses are free-standing,
they enable parties who are not direct clients of the database to
verify crucial aspects of the database’s operation.
CreDB enables every object to be coupled with an associated
semantic security policy. Because policies are enforced by TEE-
backed software, they are inseparable from their associated data.
And because they are written in a Turing-complete language, can
express rich, object-specific policies. And because the seman-
tic security policies are encoded symbolically as abstract syntax
trees, they are amenable to analysis by third parties. Coupled
with witnesses, these techniques enable a third party to inspect
the policy associated with an object and thus establish trust in the
future behavior of that object. These capabilities can be used to
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build smart contracts on CreDB.
Finally, CreDB provides a protected function evaluation
mechanism that enables clients to compute functions over remote
private data, which in turn generate witnesses carrying the result.
For the party issuing the function call, the witness yields a ver-
ifiable, portable certificate that the function has been executed,
with integrity, on the specified data, with the attached result. The
primary use of this functionality is to compute a vetted function
over private data without revealing the input data to the remote
party. For security purposes, the holder of the data retains full
control over what can be done with the data, and both parties, the
invoker, and the data holder must agree on which functions can
be executed.
While there has been much past work on high-integrity data
storage and data processing systems, to our knowledge, no
datastores exist that combine these three synergistic features.
Ryoan [21] and Opaque [55] have examined functions can be
executed across private data. Guardat [49] reduces the attack
surface of a system by enforcing data policies on the storage
layer. Further, Cipherbase [4] and EnclaveDB [41] enforce se-
curity properties using trusted hardware. Finally, past systems
have explored the use of trusted hardware to enhance audit mech-
anisms [13, 25]. CreDB takes these concepts and provides one
holistic approach to secure and tamper-proof data storage, built
using modern trusted hardware.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next sec-
tion provides the overarching data and computation model for
CreDB (Section 2). Section 3 details how this model was imple-
mented using Intel SGX. The following two sections evaluate a
full prototype of the system. The evaluation contains a qualita-
tive part, explaining how to implement several sample applica-
tions (Section 4), and a quantitative part, describing the impact
our execution environment has on the performance of the system
(Section 5). We show that, depending on the workload, CreDB
can process up to 50k operations per second on a single machine.
Further, we show that it can process about 500 transactions per
second on the TPC-C benchmark.
2 The CreDB Data Store
At a high level, every CreDB node implements a secure database
using a trusted execution environment (TEE) that clients, as well
as other nodes, can connect to. Each database instance has its
own timeline, datastore, and set of connected nodes. A CreDB
node connects to other nodes in order to create a network across
which data can be shared, and functions can be invoked, se-
curely. Clients connect through one or multiple CreDB nodes
and do not need special hardware support. This enables porting
legacy database applications to this new abstraction and provide
them with stronger integrity guarantees. Nodes and clients rely
on a public attestation service to ensure integrity and authenticity
of database nodes. Attestation services provide a public-key in-
frastructure to ensure the authenticity of parties. No private data
is transferred to the attestation service.
Applications are written against the CreDB API, which is a
superset of a traditional key-value API, and connect to a CreDB
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Figure 1: Sketched layout of the system. A network of database
nodes, each running in their own TEE. Further, client nodes con-
nect user-facing applications to the network. All nodes are inter-
connected through encrypted channels.
node of their choice. The most notable additions are timeline in-
spection, secure semantic policies, witness generation, and pro-
tected function evaluation, which we discuss below after we pro-
vide the basic object and event model on which the system is
based.
2.1 Assumptions and Attack Model
Following previous work [6] we assume a very strong attack
model: an adversary might have root access to the database
server. This includes full control over the scheduler, the file sys-
tem, and network communication. The attacker may tamper with
the hardware, except for the CPU itself.
We further assume that clients may mistrust each other. This
means clients need assurance that data can only be modified by
parties they specify. Further, they demand control over what in-
formation is leaked to other parties, including the database ad-
ministrator.
Replication and crash recovery are out of the scope of this
work, however, the presented model can be extended to be fault-
tolerant. This paper discusses such mechanisms in Section 6.
2.2 Objects and Events
CreDB exposes a flexible object model that accommodates un-
structured, as well as structured, data. Objects are collections
of attribute-value pairs, where attributes can have types such
as lists, dictionaries, binary data, and primitive values, which
consist of integers, floating point numbers, and strings. Binary
data can contain executable code representing stored procedures.
Each object is associated with a specific collection (similar to ta-
bles in relational datastores).
The datastore maintains a partially-ordered log of events, each
relating to one or more objects. Events record the creation, up-
date, or deletion of an object. Events store the new value of all
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updated objects. In the case of a deletion, the new value is a
tombstone entry⊥. Figure 2 gives an example of the lifetime of
an object x, where eachmodification creates a state transition and
a new event that holds the most recent value. Events relating to
the same object are arranged in a total order to guarantee lineariz-
ability [20]. Further, in case events are created by a transaction
that spans multiple objects, an event may also capture the de-
pendencies between versions of different objects. For instance,
Figure 3 shows an event from a transaction that reads from ob-
ject “foo” and then writes to object “bar”. Crucially, events that
are unrelated are not ordered with respect to each other.
42 43 ⊥
version 1 version 2 version 3
put("x", 42) add("x", 1) delete("x")
Figure 2: The lifetime of an object mapped to a sequence of
events. Because CreDB guarantees strong consistency this order
must be total. ⊥ represents a deleted object (i.e. ”tombstone”
entry)
2.3 Timeline Inspection
⊥
42
43
⊥
c.put("foo", 42)
c.add("foo", 1)
c.remove("foo")
⊥
47
tx = c.init_tx()
x = tx.get("foo")
tx.put("bar", x+5)
tx.commit()
Object “foo” Object “bar”
write dependency read dependency
Figure 3: A transaction encoding its causal dependency, which
stems from a read it performed, into the timeline. The log en-
codes how two concurrent clients affect the objects.
Unlike a traditional key-value store, CreDB enables histori-
cal retrievals from any previous point in time. The desire for
such rich semantics has been underscored by the interest in both
blockchains and bitemporal databases [44]. CreDB thus imple-
ments an eidetic database that stores the set of all modifications
to all objects, which is essential for analysis and audit and pro-
duces an API for inspecting historical values.
The CreDB API enables clients to retrieve previous ver-
sions of an object using the get_version and get_history calls.
get_version takes an object key and version id and returns that
object’s state at that specific point in the timeline as well as the
corresponding event id. Similarly, get_history takes an object
key, and returns a sequence of all versions of an object and their
event identifiers. An event id can then be used to retrieve more
information about the context that an object was modified in. In
particular, if the object was created as part of a transaction, it al-
lows to retrieve the read and write sets of said transaction. This
is enabled through the get_read_set and get_write_set. For all
events, we can further query the party that issued the modifica-
tion using the get_op_source call.
Each event identifier corresponds to a tuple of an object key
and a version number. While version numbers of the same ob-
ject are totally ordered, event identifiers are not required to be.
This enables the datastore to support multiple concurrent up-
dates and obviates the need to have a single, totally-ordered log,
which would hamper performance. This design decision is cou-
pled with our decision to have a partial order between unrelated
events. Thus, our API is only guaranteed to answer questions of
the form “what was X’s value when I updated Y?” if X was in
the read set of the transaction that updated Y.
Figure 3 illustrates how a read-dependency is encoded. When
inspecting the event that sets “bar” to 47, the API will return a
reference to the value of “foo” when it was read by the transac-
tion. The immutable log ensures that this timeline is final and can
be reasoned about safely. The database can then answer ques-
tions such as “who has updated X since it was first created?”.
For instance, in the example from Figure 3 calling get_history
on object “foo” would return a sequence of [42, 43] and their
corresponding event identifiers.
2.4 Secure Semantic Policies
Secure semantic policies enable applications to associate
application-specific constraints with an object. These policies
are inseparable from the object to which they belong and invi-
olable even by the principal controlling the database instance.
To access the database, a user must necessarily go through the
CreDB secure semantic policy enforcement engine mandated by
the TEE. Thus, even an attacker who takes over the database can-
not subvert the access policies associated with objects. In case of
accessing a previous version of the object, that version’s policy
and state will be used to make an access control decision.
Each CreDB node maintains a registry of identities, which can
be leveraged by policies to make an access decision. Identities
are tuples consisting of a human-readable name and a public key.
This registry is used to prevent man-in-the-middle and imper-
sonation attacks. We assume a public key infrastructure (PKI).
When a previously unknown party connects to a node, it queries
the PKI to gather information about said node.
Identities are inseparable from the associated authenticated
communication channel. In particular, nodes cannot change their
identity after a connection has been set up. The rather complex
authentication and attestation mechanisms then only has to be
done once, when setting up the channel. Policies and stored
procedures can always rely on the authenticity of the referenced
identities.
Policies are specified at the time of an object’s creation and
can be modified after the fact only if the policy permits it. And
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changes to a policy are stored in the object’s timeline just like
changes to all other fields of the object. Accesses to an object’s
value in the timeline lead to the evaluation of the object’s policy
at that point in time. In order to enable this, CreDB requires
object policies to be idempotent, i.e. they may not have any side
effects or reference the state of other objects. CreDB enforces
this by restricting the policy interpreter from performing such
operations.
Policies use the current state of the object, as well as infor-
mation about the attempted operation, to make access control
decisions. Similar to conventional stored procedures policies
have access to several modules that hold information about the
attempted operation and the object to be accessed. Two mod-
ules, in particular, are only available to secure semantic policies:
First, op_info contains information about the operation itself,
such as the kind of operation and the proposed change. Sec-
ond, op_context enables to retrieve information about the issu-
ing party, such as their identity. A full enumeration of available
modules is given in Table 1.
Name Description PFE SSP
db Interact with the database as a
client would do
Yes No
self If the function is part of an object,
this module provides access to that
object
Yes Yes
rand Bindings to the random number
generators provided by the TEE
Yes No
op_info Information about the attempted
operation
No Yes
op_context Information about the invokation
of the operation
No Yes
Table 1: Python Modules available to Server-Side Programs.
Some are only accessible by Protected Function Evaluation
(PFE), some only by Secure Semantic Policies (SSP), others by
both.
Policies are then represented as a single function that re-
turns a boolean. Figure 1 illustrates a simple policy that re-
stricts access to an object to a pre-defined set of users. Here,
aside from the policy itself, an object contains two more fields:
authorized_users specifies who is allowed to access the data and
data holds the confidential data itself. More complex policies
are enabled due to the fact that SSPs can make use of timeline
inspection. In particular, they can examine the object’s timeline,
for instance, to determine how often an object has been modi-
fied, in total or by a specific client, or check the object’s history
against a predicate.
To enable richer application semantics, CreDB further allows
associating a policy with a collection. Such collection policies
may, for example, specify who can create or modify any object in
the collection. Further, they can enforce a schema on the data, by
rejecting all updates that miss required fields or contain fields in
an invalid format. Collection policies thus allow to break down
application logic into multiple concurrent objects without sacri-
Listing 1: A policy limiting authorized users to read the data
field.
import self
from op_info import target
from op_context import source
if target != "data";
# only the data f i e l d can be accessed
return False
users = self.get(’authorized_users ’)
return source in users
ficing integrity.
2.5 Witnesses
Witnesses are a permanent, external, and free-standing record of
the database state. They encode a set of events with respect to
their position in the timeline and are signed by the private key of
the CreDB instance. Because of their free-standing nature, wit-
nesses are useful even beyond the existence of the issuing ser-
vice.
A witness is comprised of a list of events, as well as their lo-
cation in the timeline and potential causal dependencies between
each other. Witnesses are generated automatically in response
to every transaction on the database and passed along with the
transaction’s result to the calling party. The set of events inside
a witness then corresponds to the state of the object at the time
the transaction read or updated them.
Witnesses enable auditing applications that use CreDB as their
datastore. Applications generate witnesses by issuing transac-
tions to the datastore, which can then be shown to other parties
as a proof of action. For example, witnesses can serve as a pay-
ment receipt or a proof of ownership for a certain asset. Further,
witnesses can be used to prove that an update was not made using
false assumptions by capturing the read set of a transaction at the
time of commit. For example, a bank clerk who wants to show
that they observed an irregularity in a bank account before de-
clining a credit request can refer to a specific point in an object’s
timeline by using a witness.
The CreDB API supports three key actions on witnesses: (1)
verifying them for authenticity, (2) examining witness contents,
and (3) ordering witnesses with respect to each other. Witness
verification ensures that a witness is authentic, that is it was cre-
ated by a TEE running CreDB. This can be achieved by check-
ing the witness against the public key of the principal provided
by the attestation service. Witness verification does not explic-
itly guarantee freshness, but a witness can include a timestamp
signed by a trusted time source to indicate the time at which it
was signed. In applications where establishing an absolute time
is not necessary, a relative order can be established using the
timeline inspection primitives described below.
By allowing clients to extract the contents of witnesses, we
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enable local timeline inspection without the need to access the
datastore itself. A local timeline can be generated from a single
witness or a set of overlapping witnesses. The clients then have
access to a timeline inspection API that provides similar function
calls as those when interacting directly with the server.
Local timeline inspection then enables checking the order of
events, the relative order of twowitnesses, or specific events con-
tained in the witnesses. A call to check_order can return: before,
after or incomparable. The datastore may return incomparable
when comparing two concurrent set of events operating on in-
dependent data items. In cases where it should be possible to
always order two witnesses, a common object must be included,
which will never yield incomparable. This approach enables
CreDB to achieve high performance, as it does not impose a to-
tal order on all concurrent transactions and instead permits the
timeline to be structured as a directed acyclic graph.
Together, these three actions enable application clients to audit
application behavior without direct access to the datastore itself.
Clients can reason about the correctness and trustworthiness of
the application logic by collecting and verifying witnesses that
are generated by the datastore and passed on by the application.
For example, they can inspect which principals have access to
their sensitive data by requesting a witness containing the data’s
access policy. A certified access policy can further provide a
guarantee that the data is protected from a malicious application.
2.6 Protected Function Evaluation
Another key primitive supported by CreDB is protected function
evaluation (PFE). PFE enables parties to invoke a custom func-
tion on a remote node in a secure execution environment guarded
by the TEE. This way, data protected by the TEE remains private
to the trusted environment, and only the designated result of the
function call is revealed to the caller.
Since computations on private data have the intended goal of
retrieving some information extracted from that data, they need
to be vetted to ensure that this leakage is permissible to all par-
ties. CreDB employs two mechanisms to perform this vetting.
First, prior to execution of a function, both the calling and the ex-
ecuting parties must approve the function. The executing party
needs to ensure that no private data is leaked and that the func-
tion execution does not take up an unreasonable amount of re-
sources. This can be done by checking the functions hash against
a whitelist or by analyzing the AST of the function. Much past
work concerns itself with the analysis of function properties, in-
cluding for information leakage [16] and information flow [30],
and is beyond the scope of our work. In addition, every single
object retrieved during a PFE has its semantic security policy
checked on every access.
After successful execution, the calling party receives a wit-
ness containing a function identifier and its result. CreDB iden-
tifies functions through the hash of their bytecode. The witness
is signed by a persistent key associated with the CreDB instance
of the executing party.
This design imposes minimal structure on CreDB witnesses.
In particular, it deliberately leaves freshness guarantees up to ap-
plications – CreDB does not purport to provide a global clock or
a total order of events. The critical observations behind this de-
cision are threefold. First, no single notion of time can serve
every application. Some applications may operate on a sub-
microsecond granularity, which could entail inordinate over-
heads, while others keep track of events in a more coarse-grained
manner. Second, even if there was a time granularity that one
could pick for most applications, current technologies for pro-
viding a trusted time source into a secure execution environment
provide much weaker guarantees than the TEE itself, because
they rely on additional hardware outside of the CPU die [14].
Finally, it has been our experience that most applications can be
implemented using simple happens-before relationships between
the affected objects.
2.7 Summary and API
We outlined the four core features provided by CreDB, beyond
conventional key-value storage. Together, these synergistic fea-
tures make CreDB a high-integrity datastore which protects the
data from unwanted access and provides strong accountability.
Thus, CreDB can be described as a “blockchain of one,” a self-
standing blockchain that does not rely on expensive data repli-
cation or other consensus mechanisms.
Table 2 shows all operations supported by CreDB. In addi-
tion to executing standalone, operations can be executed in the
context of a transaction. Until committed, transactions create a
locally isolated view of the database and the attempted changes.
These changes are only merged if no conflicts are detected on
commit.
3 Implementation
We implemented a fully-functional prototype of the CreDB
database. The prototype is built on top of the Intel SGX SDK,
which provides a well-documented TEEwith certain restrictions.
In particular, the memory encryption mechanism that protects
TEEs from unwanted access causes a severe limitation on mem-
ory that can be accessed efficiently. SGX hardware supports an
encrypted page cache (EPC) that can be accessed through an in-
hardware encrypted page cachemodule (EPCM) [14]. Currently,
all SGX-enabled CPUs support an EPC of at most 128MB. This
EPC also needs to hold program code and stack. From our ex-
perience, this results in an available heap size of roughly 90MB.
While future generations of CPUsmight increase the EPC size, it
seems unlikely that such a size restriction disappear completely.
Not only data that is held in heapmemory, but also function argu-
ments need to be encrypted and decrypted when crossing enclave
boundaries, for example when a network message is passed from
the untrusted part of the database to the enclave.
In order to overcome these performance limitations, our pro-
totype design follows two goals. First, we aim to keep the over-
all memory consumption low, by using efficient and lightweight
data structures. Second, the implementation minimizes the
amount of memory that has to be moved in and out of the EPC.
The latter is achieved through a custom paging mechanism de-
scribed in the next section.
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3.1 A concurrent append-only log
  
Shard 1 Shard 2 Shard 3
epoll()
Trusted Enclave
Server
Write-Locked Read-Locked Sealed
Figure 4: Implementation of a CreDB node: The keyspace is
broken down into multiple shards. Each shard stores its events
in a sequence of blocks.
CreDB nodes achieve high throughput by breaking down their
keyspace into n shards. Consistent hashing is used to assign a
key range to each of the shards, where n is set sufficiently large
to exceed the number of hardware threads available. Each node
then runs multiple concurrent threads, inside and outside the en-
clave, to efficiently leverage the sharded setup, visualized in Fig-
ure 4. The untrusted threads wait on a multi-threaded event loop
built on top of epoll. Once an event is dispatched by an untrusted
thread it is forwarded to a trusted thread. In our prototype, the
ratio of trusted to untrusted threads is 1, such that once an un-
trusted thread has dispatched a new message, there is always
a trusted thread available to process it. We set the number of
threads to twice the number of available CPU cores. Threads
then update the log by working with one or multiple shards. In
order to achieve strong consistency, only one thread at a time
can update the same shard. This is enforced through a read-write
locking mechanism inside the TEE.
In order to enforce the append-only mechanism for the log,
the timeline for each shard is sequenced into blocks. Only the
newest block is then modified when a new event is inserted into
the log, the other blocks are considered sealed. A primary index
structure allows retrieving the most recent event associated with
an object, without having to perform a linear scan across the log.
Secondary indexes can be created to quickly react to more com-
plex queries. CreDB’s custom paging mechanism moves blocks
in and out of the EPC. Previous work has shown that a reference
count based mechanism can achieve a significant performance
benefit compared to SGX native paging mechanism [39]. A ded-
icated, shard-aware, and CreDB-specific paging mechanism al-
lows accommodating arbitrarily large data sizes in the enclave’s
fixed heap space. Blocks are only evicted if no threads are using
them at the current point in time. Eviction is run whenever the
number of blocks in EPC memory exceeds a certain size. Be-
sides being stored on the local file system, encrypted blocks are
also cached in the untrusted memory to retrieve them quickly.
A similar paging mechanism is also employed for primary and
secondary indexes.
3.2 Ensuring Data Freshness
Because paging moves data out of the enclave, CreDB employs
mechanisms to avoid stale data from being loaded back into the
enclave. The enclave can easily detect corrupt data due the to the
encryption scheme applied to the data blocks, however, a sepa-
rate measure is required to detect stale data from being loaded.
For each shard, only the most recent, i.e. pending, block is con-
sidered mutable. On each modification, the pending block will
be saved to disk. Once a block has reached a specific size it will
be marked sealed both in memory and on disk. The enclave then
always keeps the pending block in memory and only allows to
load sealed blocks.
Unlike data blocks, indexes are mutable and require a differ-
ent mechanism to ensure their freshness. CreDB implements au-
thenticated hash maps for this purpose. The hash map breaks
down the keyspace into buckets where each bucket is essentially
a linked list of key-value pairs. For each bucket, the hash map
holds the identifier of the first page of that bucket as well as a
version number, which is a simple integer. These references are
always kept in memory. Each page then holds the identifier and
a version number for their successor, if it exists. On each up-
date, all version numbers and references of that bucket are up-
dated. When loading a page the implementation can then check
it’s freshness by comparing version numbers.
3.3 Efficient Transaction Processing and Witness
Generation
CreDB implements serializable transaction that yield witnesses.
Transaction processing uses optimistic concurrency control [24]
to prevent malicious parties from breaking liveness of the sys-
tem. The party initiating the transaction sends a message con-
taining all reads and a set of writes. In the validation phase, the
node checks that policies grant all reads and modification made
by the transaction. It further validates all reads made during the
speculative execution on the client side. If no conflicts are de-
tected, the node proceeds to the write phase, where it issues all
updates to the log by creating new events. Further, events are
annotated with causal dependencies using the transactions read
set. Locks are only acquired during validation and write phase of
the transaction, all of which can be executed on the server-side
without leaving the trusted environment. Further, locks to shards
are always acquired in the same order, to ensure no deadlocks are
introduced during concurrent transactions.
We then extend the transaction primitive to enable account-
ability by generating witnesses after a successful commit.
Clients can request the generation of a witness as a result of a
transaction. In particular, we add a certification phase after the
write phase. This step is optional, in order to allow clients that do
not need self-standing witnesses to avoid additional overheads.
The certification phase takes the read set, as well as the set of
events created in the write phase. From these, it generates a di-
gest and signs it using the enclaves private key. This way, only
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a single asymmetric cryptographic operation per transaction has
to be executed by the CreDB node.
3.4 Peering Handshake
All communication between other CreDB nodes and clients re-
quire a secure, confidential, and authenticated channel in or-
der to uphold all of the datastore’s integrity guarantees. This
is achieved by using a remote attestation. Remote attestation
consists of a handshake that serves two purposes. First, it sets
up an encrypted channel using a Diffie-Hellmann Key Exchange
(DHKE) rooted in the TEE. Second, it verifies that the TEE is
executing a non-modified version of the CreDB implementa-
tion. Previous work has described how such attestation channels
can be set up, for example, to establish a secure payment chan-
nel [29].
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Figure 5: The attestation handshake establishes a secure channel
between two parties. If both of them provide a trusted environ-
ment, it has to be executed in an identical fashion going the other
way.
The attestation process can be broken down into eight steps,
which are visualized in Figure 5. (1) The initiating party sends
its Group ID (an SGX specific detail), public key (used to verify
authenticity), and name (for easy addressing of the node). (2)
The other party then responds by also sharing its public key and
name. Parties can store known public keys and/or use public key
infrastructures to ensure the authenticity of other parties, as de-
scribed in Section 2.4. (3)(4) Once both parties have shared their
public keys they can initiate a DHKE to generate a shared secret.
(5) The initiating party then sends a quote of their enclave. A
quote is generated from a snapshot of the enclaves content, in-
cluding both data and loaded program code. It can thus be used
to reliably identify the code running on the remote party. (6)(7)
The other party forwards the quote to an attestation service. At-
testation services are Intel-verified entities that can check the en-
clave’s signature for validity. This step is needed to support re-
vocation of keys of malicious CPUs. (8) Once the attestation
service has verified the quote, the result is sent back to the initi-
ating party. At this point, assuming the quote and signature were
valid, a one-sided authenticated channel is setup up.
In order to set up a bidirectional channel between two CreDB
nodes, this attestation handshake is performed once in each di-
rection. There might be ways to shorten the bidirectional hand-
shake process by avoiding redundant messages. However, the
latency of remote attestation does not affect overall performance
as the CreDB model assumes long-running connections between
nodes.
3.5 Trusted Program Execution
Efficient program and policy evaluation are enabled by a
lightweight Python interpreter that runs inside the TEE. Our im-
plementation aims to find a middle ground between ease of use
and efficiency. CreDB clients come with a compiler that can
convert a subset of Python to a compressed abstract syntax tree
(cAST). The cAST can then be stored as bytecode on a CreDB
node. Programs run in isolation but are able to access other parts
of the TEE using Python bindings that are shipped as part of the
implementation.
The execution environment further protects nodes from mali-
cious programs exhausting the EPC size. Programs can be exe-
cuted with pre-defined execution limits: such as the amount of
memory it can use up themost, the number of execution steps it is
allowed to take, and the number of remote functions it is permit-
ted to call. The node keeps track of the program memory con-
sumption and amount of execution steps, if execution exceeds
either limit, it is aborted. The result of the function call is then
either an error code representing why the function was aborted
or the result of the function itself.
Each execution environment is assigned its own userspace
thread that can safely be suspended if needed. Programs run non-
preemptively and either pause when waiting for a message from
another node, or stop when they have exhausted execution lim-
its. This achieves two purposes. First, hardware threads are not
occupied by programs that are waiting for an I/O operation to fin-
ish. Second, execution of the system will not halt, even if more
programs execute than the number of threads supported by the
TEE. This overcomes another limitation of the current SGX gen-
eration, which is that TEEs can only execute up to a pre-defined
limit of hardware threads.
4 Example Applications
CreDB provides a novel programming model for building high-
integrity applications in a Byzantine environment. To demon-
strate the practicality of this model, this section describes mul-
tiple applications. These applications leverage server-side pro-
gram evaluation, both in the form of stored procedure and poli-
cies, to provide rich application logic on top of CreDB. Together
with stored procedures, policies enable to implement state ma-
chines in form of an object. Stored procedures can define pos-
sible state transitions, while the policies restrict when and by
whom these transitions can be invoked.
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4.1 Multi-Tenant Datastores
Keeping data secure from unprivileged access is a common prob-
lem in enterprise datastores. Often a shared nothing architecture,
where each tenant has their own distinct protected storage area,
is not feasible as tenants might still want to exchange, or grant
temporary access to, privileged data. For example, HIPAA com-
pliant systems have strict rules on who can access the data but
need the possibility to grant special rights to users in case of an
emergency.
Listing 2: An access control policy
import self
from op_context import source_name
from op_info import is_modification
ACL_NONE = 0
ACL_READ = 1
ACL_WRITE = 2
if self.contains("acl." + source_name)
val = self.get("acl." + source_name)
if is_modification:
return val & ACL_WRITE
else
return val & ACL_READ
else:
# Deny access i f no entry in ACL
return False
Access Control Lists (ACLs) are the state-of-the-art mecha-
nism to enforce multi-user access rights on a set of objects. Each
ACL contains amapping from user to permissions. A permission
can give users different levels of access, such as read-only, read-
/write, or execute. Permissions can then be dynamically changed
by authorized users.
We demonstrate that an ACLmechanism can be implemented,
and enforced, using CreDB’s policy system. To achieve this we
extend the policy from Listing 1 to associate each object in the
datastore with its own ACL. Each object then holds an acl-field,
which contains a mapping from users to permissions. The ob-
ject’s policy inspects the acl-field and decides whether to allow
an access or not depending on its value. Further, users with the
right privileges can modify the acl-field and, thus, change the
permissions during runtime.
4.2 Mandatory Read Logging
CreDBdoes not log read accesses by default, but applications can
enforce such a mechanism. We demonstrate a mechanism simi-
lar to one presented by Vahldiek et al. [49], that requires clients
to create a log entry before accessing the data. This mechanism
cannot track how often an object is read, or whether the read
Listing 3: A policy that enforces each read to be logged: Before
data can be read prepare_call must be invoked.
{
read_log: list := []
data: dict := {}
prepare_read: func :=
from self import contains, version_no
from op_contenxt import source_name
log_entry = {source_name , version_no()}
return append("read_log", log_entry)
policy: func :=
from self import contains, version_no
from op_context import source_name
from op_info import target, type
if target == "read_log":
# Only reads to the log
return type == READ
elif target == "prepare_read":
return type == CALL
elif target == "data":
if type == READ:
log_entry = {source_name , version_no()}
return contains("read_log", log_entry)
else:
# I t ’ s a wri te
# This w i l l be logged by de fau l t
return True
else:
# Everything e l se i s disallowed
return False
}
access was successful. However, it requires each read to be pre-
ceded by a log entry, which collects information about attempted
reads to the data.
Listing 3 illustrates how CreDB can implement this policy.
The object consists of the read log, the actual data field, as well
as two functions policy and prepare_read. When a client wants
to update the value of an object, it can just issue the write directly,
as CreDB will take care of creating and logging a new version.
However, before the client issues a read, it will need to invoke the
prepare_read function, which creates a log entry with the name
of the client and the current version number of the object. When
the client, then, tries to read the data-field, the policy will check
whether a corresponding log entry exists before granting access.
The client’s identity is authenticated by themechanism described
in Section 2.4. Note that the policy can be extended to include
other access control mechanisms.
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4.3 Checking Credit History
In order to make a decision on whether or not to grant a new loan,
a credit issuer might check the customer’s bank for their credit
history. However, the bank might not want to reveal customers’
credit history for both privacy and business reasons. Further,
the customer might have multiple bank accounts that need to be
checked. Currently, this problem is addressed through a third
party credit score agency that is trusted by all parties. Such an
approach might not always be feasible as it requires such a com-
mon trusted party to exist and usually creates additional fees and
pose additional vulnerabilities.
CreDB’s PFE mechanism natively accommodates such blind
checks. We built a verified credit score checker and execute it
on the bank’s data, without getting access to the credit data itself.
Further, it supports nested PFEs, i.e. PFEs invoking other PFEs
during their execution. The function can be vetted to ensure that
it returns solely the credit score, without leaking any sensitive
parts of the client’s credit history. First, the function queries the
client’s bank(s) in order to retrieve their credit history. It then
runs a credit score calculation on the accumulated credit history.
Because the PFE has been vetted by the client a priori, they can
ensure that no sensitive parts of their credit history are leaked.
Listing 4: The credit checker function. It first accumulates the
history from multiple sources and then executes a check on the
history.
import db
client_name = argv[0]
client_secret = argv[1]
client_banks = argv[2].split(’,’)
history = []
for bank in client_banks:
res = db.call_on_peer(bank, ’credit’, ’get_history ’,
[client_name , client_secret])
history.append(res)
balance = 0
history = sorted(history)
for time, change in history:
balance += change
if balance < 0:
return False
return True
Listing 4 shows a simplified version of the credit checker. Af-
ter vetting, the client will call this function and pass along a list
of their banks, as well as a secret that is only shared between
the banks and the client. The secret serves as a certificate that
the function has been vetted by the client. After executing PFEs
on the client’s banks, it will check the client’s overall balance.
In a real-world system, this check would be replaced by a more
sophisticated mechanism.
4.4 Confidential Elections
Using computers for voting applications is non-trivial, because
of the unique characteristics of elections. Elections must be
both private, as in nobody’s votes shall be revealed, and veri-
fiable, as in one can check that each person has voted at most
once. TeeVote is a voting service that stores its data in CreDB to
achieve ensure confidentiality and integrity. Clients are able to
securely cast ballots and verify that their vote has been counted.
However, they are not able to see other people’s vote, except for
the final tally. The application uses two collections communities
and votes.
Communities track membership of users and are used to de-
termine the quorum for a vote. A vote is associated with a com-
munity. The community defines who is allowed to take part in
the vote and what the quorum is for it to pass. The technical rea-
sons for a requiring a quorum are two-fold: First, if the number
of participants is too low, one might be able to trace back the
voting behavior of a specific user. Second, there is no source of
trusted time, so TEEvote will allow casting votes until a quorum
has been reached.
Participants interact with TEEvote through a client-side appli-
cation that directly connects to the CreDB instance. When start-
ing the application for the first time, it will generate a public-
private key pair associated with that user. It will then use the
key pair to establish its secure connection and identity with the
CreDB instance. Through this secure connection, clients can is-
sue votes, query election results, and create new communities.
Policies enforce that only well-formed community and vote
objects can be created. Well-formed in this context means that
a person can only join the same community at most once. Fur-
ther, votes must contain quorum information that matches the
communities at the time of creation.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the prototype on both macro and microbenchmarks.
Note that evaluation is done under a single server setup and that
the observed performance could be improved using horizontal or
vertical [33] scaling. For all following experiments, the server
process was hosted on Ubuntu 17.10 running Linux 4.13. The
machine is equipped with 32GB of RAM and an Intel Core i7
6700K CPU offering 8 logical cores. The current prototype uses
version 2.1 of the Intel SGX SDK and is compiled using GNU
g++7. The client workload is distributed across multiple ma-
chines to make sure only the server’s processing power can be a
possible bottleneck. The main takeaway from the result in this
section is that while the overheads associated with this kind of
secure hardware are significant, they can be mitigated using ef-
ficient implementation and paging techniques.
9
5.1 Transactional Performance
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Figure 6: The performance of CreDB under a TPC-C workload
compared to CreDB without SGX
We expose CreDB to a TPC-C workload and compare it to
a version of CreDB that doesn’t run in SGX. The experimental
setup contains four warehouses and a dataset of about one giga-
byte. Intel will most likely provide hardware with much larger
EPC sizes in the future. We thus assume that the chosen dataset
size is indicative of how future versions of CreDB will perform
on larger datasets. We use py-tpcc1, a Python implementation of
TPC-C, for all measurements. For CreDB, data is stored normal-
ized. In particular, each order is a distinct object and not part of
the client’s record.
Figure 6 visualizes the observed performance, broken down
for each query type. Each setup was evaluated under the num-
ber of clients that yielded the highest overall throughput. As ex-
pected the version of CreDB that runs without a trusted environ-
ment performs significantly better.
We further plotted both systems over a changing number of
clients in Figure 7 in order to visualize the impact of limited
trusted memory. Additionally, we plot the performance of Mon-
goDB under the same workload. We evaluated MongoDB on
denormalized data, as we observed it to perform better thanMon-
goDB on normalized data. In these experiments, MongoDB uses
the WiredTiger storage engine writing to a memory-mapped lo-
cation. Note that MongoDB has no support for ACID transac-
tions and its performance is therefore not degraded by transaction
aborts. Additionally, MongoDB does not provide the strong in-
tegrity guarantees and does not annotate the ledger with transac-
tional information. The comparison to MongoDB solely serves
as an ideal baseline.
We observe that each system scales upwith an increasing num-
ber of clients. However, CreDB’s throughput quickly reaches its
peak of about 500tx/s. We pinpoint this limitation to the fact that
once the EPC memory size is exhausted, threads will start com-
peting for memory. The variant of CreDB without SGX yields
1https://github.com/apavlo/py-tpcc
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Figure 7: The transactional performance of CreDB under a
changing number of clients compared to CreDB without SGX
and MongoDB
in about twice the performance until concurrent transactions be-
come the main bottleneck. MongoDB outperforms both imple-
mentations of CreDB due to the differences in application se-
mantics described in the previous section.
5.2 Microbenchmarks
TrustedExecution In order to understand the performance im-
pact of the TEE, we compare CreDB against MongoDB as well
as the version without SGX in microbenchmarks. As shown in
Figure 7, even with the previously described optimizations, the
current implementation suffers a significant loss in performance.
Some of this performance loss stems from the fact that data has to
be encrypted by the SGX environment. Figure 8a shows CreDB
with and without SGX in two different situations: A read-only
workload andworkloadwithmixed reads andwrites. Bothwork-
loads are small enough to fit into EPC memory. We observe that
CreDB has about a 30% overhead compared to its counterpart
that runs without SGX.
Security Policies An important question is how much the ex-
ecution of security policies harm performance. To evaluate this,
we store a 1kb object on the server. We then measure the latency
of ten clients concurrently accessing this object either with a pol-
icy protecting the access or not. The policy we implemented is
identical to that in Listing 1. Figure 8b shows a CDF of the laten-
cies per I/O operation in each case. We observe that even with a
security policy in place, operations are still executed in less than
a millisecond. A similar performance impact was observed for
other stored procedures.
Witness Generation Creating a signed certificate of a set of
events incurs a non-trivial overhead. In Figure 8c we evaluate
CreDB on a workload with read-only transactions, once while
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Figure 8: Microbenchmark results
generating witnesses and once while not generating any wit-
nesses. We observe that the witness generation produces roughly
the same overhead while decreasing a little with larger transac-
tion sizes. We attribute this overhead to the comparatively ex-
pensive asymmetric cryptographic operation that is needed to
create the witness signature. While larger transactions have to
sign a larger witness, they still only perform one cryptographic
operation which explains why the overhead decreases with larger
transactions.
6 Discussion and Future Work
More expressive object semantics The evaluated prototype
is built to scale with large-scale datasets but does not accommo-
date large individual objects. In particular, large objects are not
able to fit in enclave memory and cannot be efficiently sharded
into multiple blocks. CreDB currently mitigates this problem by
supporting collection wide policies, which allow to break down
application logic into multiple objects that are all part of the same
collection. CreDB could further be extended by supporting large
objects by only partially loading an object’s content into mem-
ory. To make such an implementation efficient, the log would
be required to only record the changes made to, and not the full
values of, objects in order to keep log size small.
Another common problem in databases that is not addressed in
this paper is schema consolidation, where different parties may
not structure their stored objects in the same manner. We envi-
sion a simple type systemwhere objects, both locally and remote,
can be checked against a specification. This can then be used to
not only check the object for a specific structure but also to ver-
ify its policy. Similarly, specifications can check other functions
that are part of the object and speed up PFE, by defining a com-
mon protocol between multiple nodes.
Handling Crash Failures Crash failures can be caused by ei-
ther broken hardware or malicious database operators that ter-
minate the execution of the enclave. While the confidentiality
of the hardware enclave cannot be broken this way, it may ren-
der the datastore inaccessible. In a real-world system, we as-
sume that database operators are economically incentivized to
replicate the encrypted data of the enclave sufficiently. Further,
witnesses provide a way to retain facts about the datastore even
after it went offline. SGX only provides limited support to pro-
tect stale data from being loaded back into the enclave after a
crash, however, mechanisms such as ROTE [34] can ensure data
freshness.
While out of the scope of this paper, a logical extension to
the CreDB database model is to include replication requirements
into the storage policies. For instance, nodes may advertise that
they replicate all updates to a set of connected nodes. Awrite will
only be considered successful when the write has been replicated
to all members of the replica set. Such successful replication
could then be certified by a witness similarly to other database
operations.
Side-channel Attacks Side-channel attacks, that is attacks that
observe the application’s behavior through non-standard com-
munication, such as looking at its CPU or cache usage, are of
constant interest in the security community. Thus, several pa-
pers have addressed how the confidentiality of trusted hardware
enclaves can be broken using such attacks [43]. Most of these
attacks benefit from the fact that weak cryptographic code, e.g.
where application secrets modify the control flow, is executed
inside the enclave. While preventing CreDB nodes from side-
channel attacks is beyond the scope of the paper, all crypto-
graphic code in the enclave is implemented using constant-time
libraries. We reserve addressing side-channel attacks against
protected function evaluation for future work.
7 Related Work
Enforcing Policies on Data TEEs are one specific instance of
secure hardware. The Nexus Operating System and its associ-
ated authorization logic [46] allow enforcing policies on appli-
cations. The Nexus uses a TPM to ensure only an authenticated
and trusted kernel can be booted. The resulting operating sys-
tem can then enforce complex constraints on applications run-
ning in its userspace. Traditional TPMs, such as the one used
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by Nexus, are usually harder to deploy as they require a fully
trusted computation stack. TEEs, on the other hand, provide a
“reverse sandbox” that shield enclave code from potentially ma-
licious host operating systems. Thus, CreDB only requires trust
in the trusted hardware and enclave code.
Information flow control is another common technique to en-
force data policies on a programs execution. SIF [12] and Fa-
ble [47] use a combination of static and dynamic information
flow tracking to enforce policies through compiler and run-
time. Fabric [31] extends this paradigm to the distributed setting.
While such techniques can protect data from malicious code, it
cannot protect from other attackers, and is, thus, orthogonal to
the mechanisms described in this paper.
In a distributed setting, certain Byzantine fault-tolerant con-
sensus protocols can be used to shield a system from misbe-
having principals [11, 9, 36]. In such an environment, the trust
lies in the network itself and a large fraction of nodes behaving
honestly. These protocols have been adopted in permissioned
blockchains. Thus, they require careful selection of committee
members and require a higher number of replicas than the ap-
proach described in this paper. Further, they do not shield from
data leakage and cannot enforce access controls.
Ensuring Data Integrity Tamper-evident logs allow detecting
Byzantine behaviors of storage servers [27, 53] and more com-
plex applications [19]. While most of these mechanisms only
provide fork consistency, A2M [13] uses trusted hardware to
achieve strong consistency in such a setup. However, even if an
audit mechanism provides strong consistency, to ensure detec-
tion of misbehavior, it requires that clients are honest and com-
municate with each other. Further, misbehavior can be detected
only after the fact which is not a strong enough guarantee for
many applications.
TrInc [25] provides a monotonic incrementer implemented in
trusted hardware. Systems like CreDB can benefit from TrInc
as it helps to protect from staleness attack, for example after an
enclave is restarted. TrInc can also be used as a primitive to build
Byzantine fault-tolerant systems with fewer replicas. However,
it cannot be used to enforce access control to data.
Proof of Retrievability (PoR) [22, 45] allows verifying that
a remote service indeed holds a dataset. PoR assumes a single
client and thus is not suitable for some of CreDB’s use cases.
One possible application for PoR in CreDB would be to verify
replication of encrypted data on a third party.
Concerto [5] is a datastore that achieves strong consistency
using server-side integrity verification Due to batch verifica-
tion, this approach achieves much higher performance than other
mechanisms [26]. However, Concerto ensures only data in-
tegrity and does not guard the data from unwanted accesses.
Guardat [49] shields data from malicious applications by en-
forcing policies in the storage layer. The high-level motivation
of Guardat is to reduce the attack surface of a complex system
to a single policy-enforcing service. CreDB takes this concept a
step further and enforces policies using trusted hardware.
Encrypted Databases If policy enforcement is not a require-
ment, i.e. users trust each other, operating on encrypted data
might be sufficient to achieve confidentiality. Maheshwari et
al. [32] presented one of the first encrypted databases. Their sys-
tem stores hashes of the encrypted data in a small trusted hard-
ware module to protect from tampering.
CryptDB [40] andMonomi [48] rely on homomorphic encryp-
tion of data. To make such a scheme efficient CryptDB does
not encrypt all data and only supports a subset of the SQL lan-
guage. TrustedDB [7] and Cipherbase [4] overcome this limita-
tion by running queries on encrypted data using a trusted hard-
ware module. All of these systems, to our knowledge, assume a
single trusted client, potentially running multiple application. In
contrast, the policy enforcement and accountability features in
CreDB are designed with multiple distrusting clients in mind.
Protecting Applications and Data using TEEs Previous
work demonstrated how to run mostly unmodified applications
in trusted virtual machines [8] or containers [6] executing in a
TEE. On a high level, the main difference between these systems
and CreDB is the choice of abstraction. CreDB can provide ap-
plications with a trusted storage system, without having to exe-
cute the application itself fully in a trusted environment. Systems
build on top of the CreDB API may thus yield in higher perfor-
mance, with the tradeoff that the application has to be ported to
this new API.
Ryoan [21] explores protecting data that is processed in the
cloud using TEEs. This is achieved through a network of en-
claves, similar to howCreDB nodes connect to each other. While
Ryoan provides a sophisticated protected function evaluation
mechanisms, it does not provide a mean for tamper-proof stor-
age of data. Further, Ryoan only supports configurations that are
static and does not provide mechanisms to scale or reconfigure
the topology.
EnclaveDB [41] provides a mechanism similar to Cipherbase
and TrustedDB but based implementation based on Intel SGX.
Similar to our evaluation the system yields much better perfor-
mance than conventional TPMs. EnclaveDB is currently limited
to a set of clients and transactions specified at compile time of
the transaction. Further, to our knowledge, it does not support
federation of database nodes or timeline inspection.
Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains Digital payment systems
have been researched for about two decades [42, 50]. However,
Bitcoin [38] was the first system that found widespread use and
interested outside out the academic community. Recently, the fo-
cus has shifted from using blockchains simply to enable digital
payment towards more generalized high-integrity storage solu-
tions. Permissioned [10, 3, 2], as well as permissionless [38, 52],
blockchains require computationally expensive replication to en-
sure integrity. CreDB, on the other hand, presents itself as a
standalone ”blockchain of one” that does not require any form
of replication for integrity.
Further TEEs can be used to build more energy-efficient con-
sensus mechanisms. Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) [1] uses a
trusted hardware enclave to ensure nodes can only forge new
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blocks once they have waited a certain period of time. Miluti-
novic et al. [37] present a scheme that uses the random function
in SGX instead of keeping track of elapsed time. Zhang et al.
further improve this scheme by using the Proof of Work for use-
ful computation [54]. These approaches are mostly suitable for
the permissionless setting, where replicas can join and leave at
any time. This is significantly different from the model CreDB
provides.
8 Conclusion
We presented CreDB, a novel datastore that provides strong in-
tegrity guarantees through trusted execution environments. We
classify CreDB as a “blockchain of one”. This novel class of
datastores combines the best of both world from conventional
key-value stores and blockchains: they do not rely on massive
replication or expensive proof of work, but still, enforce high
integrity and assurance on the data.
This paper demonstrated that CreDB allows building high in-
tegrity distributed applications with relatively low effort. Our
evaluation shows that this approach can handle hundreds of com-
plex transactions a second on a single node. Unlike conventional
BFT-systems, CreDB natively allows to scale up the system by
creating a network of database nodes. We conclude that CreDB’s
design yields high performance compared to state-of-the-art per-
missioned and permissionless blockchains.
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Basic Operations
get(C,k) Get the most recent value of k
put(C,k,v) Update the value of k
add(C,k,v) Increment value of k by v
remove(C, k) Delete object k
find(C, σ) Find all object matching the predicate
σ
init_tx() Yield a new transaction
commit(tx) Commits a transaction
Efficient Data Processing
create_index(C,n,f) Create an index n on the fields f
remove_index(C,n) Remove the index n
set_trigger(C,fx) Invoke function fxwhenever the col-
lection C is modified
unset_trigger(C) Unset the trigger on C
Reasoning about history
open(w1,w2,...) Create a local timeline using a set of
witnesses.
version_no(C,k) Get the most recent version number
of an object
get_history(C,k) Get the history (previous versions and
event ids) of an object
get_version(C,k,v) Get the version v of an object
get_read_set(eid) If eid is part of a transaction, get the
values read
get_write_set(eid) If eid part of a transaction, get other
values written besides this one
get_op_source(eid) Returns the party that caused the
modification of this object
order(w1, w2) Get the order of two witnesses
order(eid1, eid2) Get the order of two events
Inter-node connection
peer(addr) Connect the CreDB instance to a re-
mote instance
list_peers() List all connected remote parties
Function evaluation
call(C, k) Call a stored procedure
execute(func) Ship func to the server and execute
it
call_on_peer(p, k) Call a function on remote party p
Table 2: List of all CreDB API calls. Operations are bound to a
specific collection (or table) if C is their first argument.
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